The Hague is much more than the political centre of the Netherlands. It is also a city shaped by international communities, diplomatic relations, migration and historical connections with different parts of the world.
From Chinatown, with its distinctive Chinese cultural influences, to Belgisch Park, with its international residential character, the city offers many different expressions of its international identity.
Schilderswijk and Transvaalkwartier stand out for their multicultural atmosphere, diverse communities and international shops and restaurants. In contrast, Statenkwartier is known for its diplomatic environment, embassies and international institutions. Archipelbuurt adds another historical dimension, with connections to the former Dutch East Indies and Indonesia.
Other neighbourhoods, such as Zeeheldenkwartier and Laakkwartier, reflect the diversity of everyday urban life, while Benoordenhout offers a more affluent residential environment with international residents and connections to the diplomatic community. Along the coast, Scheveningen represents another aspect of the city’s international character through its maritime history, tourism and connections to the North Sea.
The international identity of The Hague is also visible beyond its residential neighbourhoods. The International Zone reflects the city’s role in international relations, law and diplomacy, reinforcing its reputation as a global city.
What makes The Hague particularly interesting is that its international character is not limited to a single district or community. It can be experienced through everyday street life, architecture, food, history and international institutions.
The Hague is a city where Dutch identity meets influences from across the world, creating a distinctive international atmosphere.
Beyond its beaches and distinctive international character, The Hague is also highly regarded for its quality of life. Its strong performance in various city rankings further reinforces its appeal as a place to live, not merely as a seaside destination.
Because of Sidney SN’s idea of For A Better World and the support he received, I share a few words about an interest I once brought into my life.
Deinstitutionalisation of Social Services
I once became interested in the lives of people with intellectual disabilities and the ways in which they can be supported. I believe that some of these individuals may, in certain situations, be more likely to be misunderstood by those around them or to find themselves in conflict situations. Such situations may arise not only from the attitudes or approaches of those providing care, but also from a lack of understanding of their behaviour, needs and specific manifestations of intellectual disabilities or behavioural disorders.
It was through this interest that I was also introduced to the concept of deinstitutionalisation of social services.
In my view, deinstitutionalisation can be one of the best approaches to supporting people with disabilities.
What Does Deinstitutionalisation of Social Services Mean?
Deinstitutionalisation of social services can be seen as the process of shifting support for people with disabilities from large-scale or residential institutions to ordinary individual settings, where they can live as normal a life as possible.
In other words, deinstitutionalisation is also used to refer to the shift towards providing social services focused on supporting individuals to live in natural environment.
Even in Czechia, this idea has existed since 2007 as part of the Transformation of Social Services initiative by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. However, mainstream social services in the country do not generally put this idea into practice.In many cases, social services providers, their management or employers may not even understand what deinstitutionalisation means.
The Concept of Deinstitutionalisation
“The purpose of social services should not be to create the best-functioning institution possible for the people who use them, but to enable them to live as fulfilling a life as possible beyond its boundaries.”
In my view, deinstitutionalisation is particularly important when it comes to supporting people with disabilities. This means gradually moving away from institutional care and residential facilities towards individualised support services. The aim is not simply to replace one type of facility with another—from large-scale or residential institutions to an ordinary house or flat (1)—but to provide services that enable people to enjoy a good quality of life and take advantage of the opportunities the wider world has to offer.
The goal should not be to concentrate people in one place where all their needs are met under one roof and where their lives are largely organised and controlled by the facility and its rules. This is institutionalisation in the way services are delivered. Deinstitutionalisation, by contrast, seeks to promote the inclusion of people with disabilities in ordinary life, encourage their contact with the wider world and tailor support to each individual. A key principle of deinstitutionalisation is that the person should not have to adapt to the needs or the rules of the service, but the service should adapt to the person.
For example, in the case of an autistic person, this should mean adapting the environment, communication methods, sensory stimuli, daily routine, or the way support is provided, rather than automatically labelling the person as “problematic” because they do not adapt to environment of a services.
Ideally, support workers should have enough time to focus on each person, get to know their needs and help them navigate the world around them. They should also help people maintain their dignity and live as fulfilling a life as possible, making the most of the opportunities available to them.
It is equally important to promote independence wherever possible, enabling people to make decisions about their own lives to the greatest extent they can. This is not just about providing basic care and ensuring safety, but also about enabling freedom, preserving dignity and offering genuine choices.
An institutional service may meet some of a person’s needs, but if their daily life takes place primarily inside the facility or its grounds, they are also separated from the wider world and the opportunities it offers. Their daily routines, options and social contacts then depend largely on the rules and operation of the institution. They may also have fewer opportunities to build relationships with people outside the walls of a facility or to be better understood by society at large.
Many people are familiar with little beyond the institution in which they live. As a result, they may not have enough opportunities to discover different ways of life, build relationships outside the institution, develop their abilities or find out what they can achieve independently. What may appear to staff to be a well-organised care system can therefore represent a severely restricted world for the person receiving support.
In my view, the purpose of social services should not be to create the best-functioning institution possible for the people who use them, but to enable them to live as fulfilling a life as possible beyond its boundaries.
Naturally, this should involve providing each person with the level of support they need and respecting their individual abilities and circumstances.
This is what I see as the essence of deinstitutionalisation: not merely changing the location of care by moving it into an ordinary house or flat, but fundamentally changing the approach itself to supporting people with disabilities. The aim should be to create a model of support that places as few restrictions as possible on their ability to live a dignified and fulfilling life, without stigma.
Notes: (1) Equally important aspects of inclusion include ensuring that people are not labelled in any way that emphasizes their association with institutional care. There is no need to put name tags or other identification labels on clothing or personal belongings solely to help staff identify the people they support. Staff should know the people they support and address their individual needs naturally as part of everyday life, in much the same way as in an ordinary family environment. This helps prevent institutional practices and stigma.
The same principle also applies to the domestic environment itself. A home should feel like a real home, not an institution. This includes limiting unnecessary institutional features, such as noticeboards displaying instructions for staff, operational procedures or other administrative information in the shared living spaces.
This principle also applies to the transportation of service users. Vehicles used to transport them should not unnecessarily draw attention to the fact that their passengers receive social services or reinforce the stigma associated with institutional care.
Deinstitutionalisation also raises the question of institutional features that may persist even in an otherwise ordinarily furnished home environment. One example is the placement of fire extinguishers and other safety equipment, which may be determined by institutional procedures rather than by the character and layout of the home. Of course, these institutional features cannot always be removed, as safety requirements must be met. However, the key is to seek solutions that ensure the necessary level of safety while preserving the character of an ordinary home, rather than reintroducing the appearance and routines of an institution into the living environment.
Another important principle of inclusion is, for example, that when people go out into the community, no more than two people should accompany a single staff member at any one time. This helps prevent the formation of larger groups that could attract unwanted attention, place a burden on the wider community and reinforce the stigma associated with receiving social services. It also reduces the risk of stigmatisation during group transfers or visits to publicly accessible places and services. The aim is to enable service users to access these places naturally, as part of everyday life in society, without being unnecessarily singled out as a group of people receiving social services.
I am certainly not the only person who sometimes finds it rather strange that contemporary protests in France are attributed by some people to particular ethnic groups. In my view, this is partly a matter of ignorance, partly politics, and partly simply the result of making foolish claims without understanding French culture.
In my view,
France
Ossuaire de Douaumont
has a deeply rooted culture of intense protest that extends across French society as a whole. The fact that some contemporary conflicts take place in areas with high proportions of people of immigrant origin may influence the local demographic composition of those taking part in protests, but this does not in itself explain French protest culture or nationwide mobilization.
France has a very long tradition of intense political and social mobilization. Its roots can be traced back to the French Revolution and the revolutionary and workers’ movements of the nineteenth century. Mass mobilisation and social pressure became established ways of pursuing political and social demands in France.
Very important part of this tradition is the French concept of rapport de force (1) — the idea that a social group can build up enough pressure to force change. Protest therefore does not necessarily have to be seen merely as an expression of opinion, but also as a means of negotiation and a way of shifting the balance of power.
Wars and decolonization also became part of this history. In particular, the Algerian War of 1954–1962 brought a major conflict directly into metropolitan France. Algerians living in France organised demonstrations of their own, while French society itself was deeply divided over colonialism, the war, and the future of Algeria. The events of 17 October 1961 and the Charonne station demonstration in 1962 demonstrate how dramatically tensions between the state, the police and protesters could escalate.
Even more significant was 1968.
May 1968 did not begin as a protest over immigration. It began as a student movement, but workers and other sections of French society quickly joined it. This was followed by a massive general strike involving millions of employees, according to historical estimates. The protests affected universities, factories, schools and public spaces across the country. The concerns of that generation also included the Vietnam War, authority, working conditions and broader demands for social change.
This history is important for understanding France today.
French protest culture is not something that immigration brought into the country, as is sometimes suggested.
The French police and government themselves are not claiming that migrants are the driving force behind the current protests.
In fact, their current claim is quite different: that the mobilization is being driven or exploited by the radical left, particularly LFI (La France insoumise) and certain student and trade union organizations.
To French protest culture, immigrants and their descendants could instead gradually become part of an already established French culture of protest, just as they could become involved in many other areas of French social and political life.
Contemporary protests may therefore have their own specific social, economic or political causes, but the mere fact that protests in France can become highly intense or even violent is nothing new. It is part of a much longer historical development. French people can sometimes look like an abolitionists in their approach to political and social issues.
It is also reasonable to assume that if France were directly attacked, its strong tradition of collective mobilization and historical memory of the Resistance could contribute to civilian resistance, rather than leaving the defense of the country exclusively to the armed forces.
In this respect, as in many others, the French experience can provide useful examples. In some societies, people may not even recognize the systematic erosion of their capacity for a war crimes and other serious abuses. In a society such as France, however, rather than once again taking a similar approach, it is reasonable to expect much stronger resistance.
In conclusion, from a historical and cultural perspective, the French culture of intense protest or resistance is a phenomenon that is deeply rooted throughout French society.
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(1) “Rapport de force” is a French expression meaning a balance of power between opposing parties. It describes a situation in which two or more sides have conflicting interests and use their respective forms of power or leverage to influence the outcome.
In other words, a rapport de force is essentially about who has greater leverage and how that leverage affects the outcome.
For example, in a labour dispute, striking garbage collectors may have considerable bargaining power because stopping waste collection can have an immediate impact on everyday life. Similarly, a public-transport strike can create significant pressure because of its effect on society.
The concept also applies to politics. The French approach gives examples such as the Liberation of France, when the political forces emerging from the Resistance were strong enough to push through major social and economic reforms, or the feminist movements of the 1970s, which gained enough political influence to contribute to the legalization of abortion.
In simple terms, rapport de force describes who has greater leverage in a conflict or negotiation, how that power is used, and how the balance between the opposing sides can change over time.
In other words, “rapport de force” means that an action is not merely an expression of disagreement, but a means of putting pressure on the other side.
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The French government has acknowledged that the students’ discontent is real…
On 7 October, Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu said that “the anger of young people does not come from nowhere” and that nobody could remain indifferent to the anxieties they are expressing. Lecornu referred to the broader concerns affecting the younger generation and stressed the government’s responsibility to listen to them and rebuild their trust.
The protests have also grown beyond the students themselves, attracting teachers, parents, trade unionists and other members of the public. What began as a student-led movement has therefore developed into a broader wave of public support around concerns about education and public services.
On 7 October, the government also had announced five areas of work in response to the mobilization, including replacing missing teachers, improving school facilities, the organization of school hours, and greater transparency in Parcoursup. The first concrete decisions are expected to be presented by the end of October.
In a note of this article about a French approach’s, the protests also can illustrate the French idea of rapport de force—the use of collective strength to create enough leverage to make those in power respond to demands they might otherwise ignore.
I already mentioned Luxembourg in article, Luxembourg: How Multicultural Principles Became the Foundation of the World’s Richest Country, and here is other example of an economic model in Luxembourg...
Luxembourg
offers a striking paradox in the European migration debate: more than half of its population was born abroad, yet the country has some of the highest wages and living standards in Europe.
This challenges the simple assumption that high immigration necessarily leads to economic problems, greater pressure on public services, or a decline in living standards. Luxembourg’s experience is more complicated — and potentially more instructive.
According to the latest Eurostat data, in 2025 Luxembourg was the only EU country where more than half of the population aged 15–74 had been born abroad — specifically, 56.1%.
The picture becomes even more interesting when we look at newcomers. In 2024, 85.5% of immigrants arriving in Luxembourg came from another EU country, the highest share in the entire EU.
Luxembourg City
Luxembourg is also a country with exceptionally high wages by EU standards. In 2024, the average annual full-time adjusted salary was €83,000, the highest among all EU member states. By comparison, the figure was approximately €59,600 in Belgium, €53,800 in Germany, €43,800 in France and €24,000 in Czechia.
And this is not simply about the average wage.
As of 1 June 2026, Luxembourg’s minimum wage for an unskilled worker is €2,771.33 gross per month, while the minimum wage for a skilled worker reaches €3,325.59.
Luxembourg also represents an economic model in which the “economy” is not about trying to force people living on the margins or on social benefits to survive on minimum incomes while facing living costs.
Immigrants are not merely a cost. They are also part of the economy.
That may be the most important point of the Luxembourg example.
An immigrant is not simply someone who uses public services. They are also a worker, consumer, tenant, entrepreneur, taxpayer, and someone who contributes to economic output.
In Luxembourg, this mechanism is visible almost textbook-style.
Foreign workers enable companies to fill positions that the country’s small domestic population would not be able to cover on its own.
And cross-border workers even allow Luxembourg to attract labour without requiring all of these people to live in the country.
Imagine source: Luxembourg Times
The result is an economy that is exceptionally open to foreign labour.
Luxembourg therefore offers an interesting counterexample to the simplistic assumption:
more migrants = less wealth.
Reality can be structured in precisely the opposite way.
If an economy is able to genuinely integrate foreign workers into the labour market, if there is strong demand for labour, functioning institutions, high productivity and employment, and if the state is able to generate sufficient public revenue from economic activity, foreign labour can become part of a mechanism that supports a high standard of living.
Luxembourg may seem like an extreme case: it has one of the highest rates of immigration in the European Union — and at the same time the highest average wages. It has an enormous share of foreign workers — and at the same time one of the strongest economies in the EU.
The Luxembourg experience suggests that a much more important question than “How many migrants does a country have?” may be:
“How is a country able to integrate their potential into its economy?”
And that is precisely what makes Luxembourg one of the most interesting cases in Europe.
In a way, I was expecting France to introduce measures sooner or later. France has the largest free tekno community in Europe, although not in terms of population size, as the Czechia may rank among the highest on a per-capita basis. I am among those who have strong reservations about free tekno for many serious reasons, and France has, in a way, completed the closure of Western Europe.
The legal position of the traditional free party has changed fundamentally across Western Europe.
An Unannounced Free Party Without Permission Is No Longer a Practically Legally Tolerated Model in Western Europe
An unannounced free party — a music gathering organised without prior notification or permission from the authorities, typically at a location not intended for such an event — is increasingly no longer treated as something that can simply take place outside the normal legal framework.
Western European countries have different legal systems and use different mechanisms. Some require prior authorisation, others require notification or declaration, while others give police extensive powers to disperse unauthorised gatherings and seize equipment.
The practical result, however, is increasingly similar: the traditional model of an unannounced free party without permission is no longer a practically legally tolerated form of event organisation in Western Europe.
A Broader European Development
The change is particularly significant because the free party was historically associated with operating outside the conventional entertainment system.
Unlike a conventional festival, concert or club event, a free party could be organised without a commercial venue, without a formal promoter and without the normal administrative procedures. A sound system could arrive at an improvised location and the event could develop through informal networks.
That model increasingly conflicts with modern public-order regulation.
Authorities across Western Europe have developed mechanisms allowing them to intervene when large unauthorised music gatherings take place. These mechanisms can concern public safety, noise, traffic, environmental protection, land use, emergency access and the management of large crowds.
France Completes the Recent Shift in Western Europe
France has recently completed a broader shift that had already been visible elsewhere in Western Europe.
Since August 2026, French law has established a specific declaration regime for certain privately organised music gatherings held at places that are not equipped for such events. The relevant legal category covers gatherings expected to involve more than 250 people and meeting additional statutory conditions.
The significance of the French reform is that it brings several elements of this increasingly restrictive approach together within one explicit legal framework. The consequences of organising a qualifying gathering without the required declaration can include criminal liability, while the law also provides for the confiscation of equipment used to commit the offence under specified conditions.
Excerpt from the legislation concerning individual participants
A person who participates in an assembly referred to in Article L. 211-15, where the unlawful nature of that assembly has been publicly notified in accordance with the final paragraph of Article L. 211-15, is liable to a term of imprisonment of six months and a fine of €7,500.
Criminal proceedings may, including in cases of repeat offending, be disposed of by payment of a fixed penalty of €500, subject to the conditions laid down in Articles 495-17 to 495-25 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The reduced fixed penalty is €400, while the increased fixed penalty is €1,000.
This provision also applies to foreign nationals participating in such an assembly in France. Article L. 211-15-4 contains no exemption for foreign nationals and does not make liability conditional upon French citizenship or residence in France.
Excerpt from Sanction
A person who directly or indirectly contributes to the preparation, organisation, holding or conduct of an assembly referred to in Article L. 211-5 is liable to a term of imprisonment of two years and a fine of €30,000.
Most significantly, the French legislation also introduced a specific offence concerning participation when the illegal nature of the gathering has been publicly announced in accordance with the law.
France therefore represents the most recent major step in a development that has been visible across Western Europe for years. The United Kingdom had already established specific legal powers against certain free raves in the 1990s, while the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg have developed their own mechanisms for dealing with unauthorised gatherings.
What France has done recently is bring several of these elements together in a particularly explicit statutory framework. The result is that the traditional unannounced free-party model now faces a much more clearly defined legal barrier in one of the countries historically associated with Europe’s free-party and sound-system culture.
The Same Principle Exists Elsewhere
The United Kingdom has had specific legal powers concerning raves since the 1990s. The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 allows police, under defined circumstances, to intervene against certain gatherings involving amplified music and to seize sound equipment.
The Netherlands has a different legal system, but Dutch police also regularly intervene against illegal rave parties. Police can stop unauthorised events and seize equipment or generators.
Belgium demonstrates another form of the same development. Municipal and local police regulations can require prior authorisation for outdoor rave or free parties, and some local regulations explicitly prohibit them.
Luxembourg has also demonstrated that an unauthorised rave can result not only in the dissolution of the event but also in the seizure of sound equipment and vehicles used to transport it.
For example, in July 2025, Luxembourg police dealt with an unauthorised rave party in the Heinerscheid area. Approximately 500 people were present, and the event was taking place in a nature-protection area. The authorities decided to dissolve the event.
Most importantly for the free-party model, the police reported that all stage and sound equipment used to organise the event, as well as the vehicles used to transport it, were seized on the order of the Diekirch public prosecutor in connection with violations of nature-protection legislation.
It does demonstrate that an unauthorised rave taking place outside the established regulatory framework can lead to a serious police and prosecutorial response.
Different Laws, Similar Practical Boundary
The legal systems of France, Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg are not identical. Their definitions, thresholds, administrative procedures and criminal sanctions differ considerably.
Britain has a specific statutory rave regime. France has a specific framework for certain “rassemblements festifs à caractère musical”, with particularly strong new sanctions since August 2026. Belgium relies substantially on local and municipal regulation. The Netherlands uses a broader system of public-order and criminal-law powers. Luxembourg can combine public-order, environmental and other legal provisions.
But from the perspective of someone organising a traditional free party, the practical boundary is remarkably similar:
Once a party is deliberately organised without notifying or obtaining the required approval from the authorities, without the required permission to use the location, and outside a legally authorised event framework, the organisers cannot normally assume that the state will simply tolerate it.
The End of a Legally Tolerated Model
The classic free-party formula — an improvised location, no prior authorisation, no notification to the authorities, a sound system and a large crowd — has progressively lost the legal space it once occupied.
