2026-10-05

Porcelain eyes

 Hi!


Recently, Sidney SN released a Heute war einfach ein besonderer Tag mix. But he has something else on his heart —Porcelain Eyes.

I don’t want to say what it means: Porcelain Eyes. It is something I see in a certain reality—This goodness tells me more about these realities than words ever could.

When it comes to music, Sidney SN should have been primarily about liquid drum and bass. In break beats, yes. However, liquid drum and bass is a melodic music, and it has quite a something in common with progressive house. 

Sidney SN’s choice of music is also about values—the values found in music such as progressive house or house.

Porcelain Eyes has different sections. And this progressive session is exclusively made up of tracks that I love… ❤️ 

01. Don’t let me go by Melarmony 

02. Just can’t stop by Hessian, Cortney Storm 

03. What I do by Because of Art 

04. Retrospect by Parallel Voices 

05. Fear No More by Parallel Voices 

06. Folding lights by CVMRN 

07. Spend my Days by MXV, L. GU, Coulson 

08. Hearth Beat by Hessian, flyckt, Farves 

09. Coming back for more by Avenue One 

010. Never Enough by Tailor, Hessian, Moders 

011. Nina by Jako Diaz 

012. Ranger by Because of Art 

013. Sharks by 16B, feat. Nour 

2026-10-04

The French Culture of Intense Protest

 I am certainly not the only person who sometimes finds it rather strange that contemporary protests in France are attributed by some people to particular ethnic groups. In my view, this is partly a matter of ignorance, partly politics, and partly simply the result of making foolish claims without understanding French culture.

In my view, 

 France


Ossuaire de Douaumont

     
has a deeply rooted culture of intense protest that extends across French society as a whole. The fact that some contemporary conflicts take place in areas with high proportions of people of immigrant origin may influence the local demographic composition of those taking part in protests, but this does not in itself explain French protest culture or nationwide mobilization.

 France has a very long tradition of intense political and social mobilization. Its roots can be traced back to the French Revolution and the revolutionary and workers’ movements of the nineteenth century. Mass mobilisation and social pressure became established ways of pursuing political and social demands in France.

Very important part of this tradition is the French concept of rapport de force — the idea that a social group can build up enough pressure to force change. Protest therefore does not necessarily have to be seen merely as an expression of opinion, but also as a means of negotiation and a way of shifting the balance of power.

Wars and decolonization also became part of this history. In particular, the Algerian War of 1954–1962 brought a major conflict directly into metropolitan France. Algerians living in France organised demonstrations of their own, while French society itself was deeply divided over colonialism, the war, and the future of Algeria. The events of 17 October 1961 and the Charonne station demonstration in 1962 demonstrate how dramatically tensions between the state, the police and protesters could escalate.

Even more significant was 1968.

May 1968 did not begin as a protest over immigration. It began as a student movement, but workers and other sections of French society quickly joined it. This was followed by a massive general strike involving millions of employees, according to historical estimates. The protests affected universities, factories, schools and public spaces across the country. The concerns of that generation also included the Vietnam War, authority, working conditions and broader demands for social change.

This history is important for understanding France today.

French protest culture is not something that immigration brought into the country, as is sometimes suggested.

The French police and government themselves are not claiming that migrants are the driving force behind the current protests. In fact, their current claim is quite different: that the mobilization is being driven or exploited by the radical left, particularly LFI (La France insoumise) and certain student and trade union organizations.

To French protest culture, immigrants and their descendants could instead gradually become part of an already established French culture of protest, just as they could become involved in many other areas of French social and political life.

Contemporary protests may therefore have their own specific social, economic or political causes, but the mere fact that protests in France can become highly intense or even violent is nothing new. It is part of a much longer historical development. French people can sometimes look like an abolitionists in their approach to political and social issues.

It is also reasonable to assume that if France were directly attacked, its strong tradition of collective mobilization and historical memory of the Resistance could contribute to civilian resistance, rather than leaving the defense of the country exclusively to the armed forces.

In this respect, as in many others, the French experience can provide useful examples. In some societies, people may not even recognize the systematic erosion of their capacity for a war crimes and other serious abuses. In a society such as France, however, rather than once again taking a similar approach, it is reasonable to expect much stronger resistance. 

In conclusion, from a historical and cultural perspective, the French culture of intense protest or resistance is a phenomenon that is deeply rooted throughout French society.

2026-10-03

How Can a Country with the Highest Share of Foreign-Born Residents Also Be the Wealthiest in Europe?

 I already mentioned Luxembourg in article, Luxembourg: How Multicultural Principles Became the Foundation of the World’s Richest Country, and here is other example of an economic model in Luxembourg... 

 Luxembourg 


 offers a striking paradox in the European migration debate: more than half of its population was born abroad, yet the country has some of the highest wages and living standards in Europe.

This challenges the simple assumption that high immigration necessarily leads to economic problems, greater pressure on public services, or a decline in living standards. Luxembourg’s experience is more complicated — and potentially more instructive.

According to the latest Eurostat data, in 2025 Luxembourg was the only EU country where more than half of the population aged 15–74 had been born abroad — specifically, 56.1%.

The picture becomes even more interesting when we look at newcomers. In 2024, 85.5% of immigrants arriving in Luxembourg came from another EU country, the highest share in the entire EU.

Luxembourg City

Luxembourg is also a country with exceptionally high wages by EU standards. In 2024, the average annual full-time adjusted salary was €83,000, the highest among all EU member states. By comparison, the figure was approximately €59,600 in Belgium, €53,800 in Germany, €43,800 in France and €24,000 in Czechia.

And this is not simply about the average wage.

As of 1 June 2026, Luxembourg’s minimum wage for an unskilled worker is €2,771.33 gross per month, while the minimum wage for a skilled worker reaches €3,325.59.

Luxembourg also represents an economic model in which the “economy” is not about trying to force people living on the margins or on social benefits to survive on minimum incomes while facing living costs.

Immigrants are not merely a cost. They are also part of the economy.

That may be the most important point of the Luxembourg example.

An immigrant is not simply someone who uses public services. They are also a worker, consumer, tenant, entrepreneur, taxpayer, and someone who contributes to economic output.

In Luxembourg, this mechanism is visible almost textbook-style.

Foreign workers enable companies to fill positions that the country’s small domestic population would not be able to cover on its own.

And cross-border workers even allow Luxembourg to attract labour without requiring all of these people to live in the country.

Imagine source: Luxembourg Times
The result is an economy that is exceptionally open to foreign labour.

Luxembourg therefore offers an interesting counterexample to the simplistic assumption:

more migrants = less wealth.

Reality can be structured in precisely the opposite way.

If an economy is able to genuinely integrate foreign workers into the labour market, if there is strong demand for labour, functioning institutions, high productivity and employment, and if the state is able to generate sufficient public revenue from economic activity, foreign labour can become part of a mechanism that supports a high standard of living.

Luxembourg may seem like an extreme case: it has one of the highest rates of immigration in the European Union — and at the same time the highest average wages. It has an enormous share of foreign workers — and at the same time one of the strongest economies in the EU.

The Luxembourg experience suggests that a much more important question than “How many migrants does a country have?” may be:

“How is a country able to integrate their potential into its economy?”

And that is precisely what makes Luxembourg one of the most interesting cases in Europe.

2026-10-02

Is No Longer a Practically Legally Tolerated Model in Western Europe


  In a way, I was expecting France to introduce measures sooner or later. France has the largest free tekno community in Europe, although not in terms of population size, as the Czechia may rank among the highest on a per-capita basis. I am among those who have strong reservations about free tekno for many serious reasons, and France has, in a way, completed the closure of Western Europe.


The legal position of the traditional free party has changed fundamentally across Western Europe. 


 An Unannounced Free Party Without Permission Is No Longer a Practically Legally Tolerated Model in Western Europe

  An unannounced free party — a music gathering organised without prior notification or permission from the authorities, typically at a location not intended for such an event — is increasingly no longer treated as something that can simply take place outside the normal legal framework.

Western European countries have different legal systems and use different mechanisms. Some require prior authorisation, others require notification or declaration, while others give police extensive powers to disperse unauthorised gatherings and seize equipment.

The practical result, however, is increasingly similar: the traditional model of an unannounced free party without permission is no longer a practically legally tolerated form of event organisation in Western Europe.

A Broader European Development

The change is particularly significant because the free party was historically associated with operating outside the conventional entertainment system.

Unlike a conventional festival, concert or club event, a free party could be organised without a commercial venue, without a formal promoter and without the normal administrative procedures. A sound system could arrive at an improvised location and the event could develop through informal networks.

That model increasingly conflicts with modern public-order regulation.

Authorities across Western Europe have developed mechanisms allowing them to intervene when large unauthorised music gatherings take place. These mechanisms can concern public safety, noise, traffic, environmental protection, land use, emergency access and the management of large crowds.

France Completes the Recent Shift in Western Europe

France has recently completed a broader shift that had already been visible elsewhere in Western Europe.

Since August 2026, French law has established a specific declaration regime for certain privately organised music gatherings held at places that are not equipped for such events. The relevant legal category covers gatherings expected to involve more than 250 people and meeting additional statutory conditions.

The significance of the French reform is that it brings several elements of this increasingly restrictive approach together within one explicit legal framework. The consequences of organising a qualifying gathering without the required declaration can include criminal liability, while the law also provides for the confiscation of equipment used to commit the offence under specified conditions.

Excerpt from the legislation concerning individual participants 

 A person who participates in an assembly referred to in Article L. 211-15, where the unlawful nature of that assembly has been publicly notified in accordance with the final paragraph of Article L. 211-15, is liable to a term of imprisonment of six months and a fine of €7,500. 

Criminal proceedings may, including in cases of repeat offending, be disposed of by payment of a fixed penalty of €500, subject to the conditions laid down in Articles 495-17 to 495-25 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.  

The reduced fixed penalty is €400, while the increased fixed penalty is €1,000. 

This provision also applies to foreign nationals participating in such an assembly in France. Article L. 211-15-4 contains no exemption for foreign nationals and does not make liability conditional upon French citizenship or residence in France. 

Excerpt from Sanction 

 A person who directly or indirectly contributes to the preparation, organisation, holding or conduct of an assembly referred to in Article L. 211-5 is liable to a term of imprisonment of two years and a fine of €30,000.

Most significantly, the French legislation also introduced a specific offence concerning participation when the illegal nature of the gathering has been publicly announced in accordance with the law.

France therefore represents the most recent major step in a development that has been visible across Western Europe for years. The United Kingdom had already established specific legal powers against certain free raves in the 1990s, while the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg have developed their own mechanisms for dealing with unauthorised gatherings.

What France has done recently is bring several of these elements together in a particularly explicit statutory framework. The result is that the traditional unannounced free-party model now faces a much more clearly defined legal barrier in one of the countries historically associated with Europe’s free-party and sound-system culture.

The Same Principle Exists Elsewhere

The United Kingdom has had specific legal powers concerning raves since the 1990s. The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 allows police, under defined circumstances, to intervene against certain gatherings involving amplified music and to seize sound equipment.

The Netherlands has a different legal system, but Dutch police also regularly intervene against illegal rave parties. Police can stop unauthorised events and seize equipment or generators.

Belgium demonstrates another form of the same development. Municipal and local police regulations can require prior authorisation for outdoor rave or free parties, and some local regulations explicitly prohibit them.

Luxembourg has also demonstrated that an unauthorised rave can result not only in the dissolution of the event but also in the seizure of sound equipment and vehicles used to transport it.

For example, in July 2025, Luxembourg police dealt with an unauthorised rave party in the Heinerscheid area. Approximately 500 people were present, and the event was taking place in a nature-protection area. The authorities decided to dissolve the event.

Most importantly for the free-party model, the police reported that all stage and sound equipment used to organise the event, as well as the vehicles used to transport it, were seized on the order of the Diekirch public prosecutor in connection with violations of nature-protection legislation.

It does demonstrate that an unauthorised rave taking place outside the established regulatory framework can lead to a serious police and prosecutorial response.

Different Laws, Similar Practical Boundary

The legal systems of France, Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg are not identical. Their definitions, thresholds, administrative procedures and criminal sanctions differ considerably.

Britain has a specific statutory rave regime. France has a specific framework for certain “rassemblements festifs à caractère musical”, with particularly strong new sanctions since August 2026. Belgium relies substantially on local and municipal regulation. The Netherlands uses a broader system of public-order and criminal-law powers. Luxembourg can combine public-order, environmental and other legal provisions.

But from the perspective of someone organising a traditional free party, the practical boundary is remarkably similar:

Once a party is deliberately organised without notifying or obtaining the required approval from the authorities, without the required permission to use the location, and outside a legally authorised event framework, the organisers cannot normally assume that the state will simply tolerate it.

The End of a Legally Tolerated Model

The classic free-party formula — an improvised location, no prior authorisation, no notification to the authorities, a sound system and a large crowd — has progressively lost the legal space it once occupied.

2026-09-25

Structural Deficits? in a French City

 I have already written about the French region of Grand Est as one of the places in France that made a good impression on me, based partly on my own experiences. I generally do not like writing about places I do not know personally, but this time I decided to take a closer look at another part of France — a city that is discussed exceptionally often in connection with violence, drugs, and organized crime: Marseille. I also considered how certain policies could further exacerbate these problems.

Marseille and Strasbourg, for instance, show how dramatically different cities of the same country can be, and even how different parts of a single French city can be from one another.


 Marseille: A Once-Thriving City and Its Decline

 


 Marseille is a city of contrasts. Once a prosperous Mediterranean metropolis with one of Europe’s most important ports, extensive trade, industry, and a seaside resort, it is now often associated with poverty, drug trafficking, gangs, and violence.

In some categories of violent crime, Marseille genuinely reaches the very top of French statistics, and even among the highest levels recorded in the European Union. In its report on the drug trade, the French Senate stated that in 2023 Marseille ranked first among the French cities examined in the number of murders and attempted murders committed within criminal circles.

However, Marseille does not appear to be a city where every part of its urban space is equally dangerous or socially troubled.

In the south of Marseille are beaches, the coastline, villa districts, parks, and areas that resemble a classic Mediterranean metropolis. In the north, by contrast, some of the city’s poorest neighborhoods, social problems, drug markets, and violence are concentrated.

 This difference is not accidental.

During the second half of the 20th century, Marseille underwent a major economic transformation. The decline of parts of traditional industry, changes in the port economy, the end of the colonial era, and subsequent migration patterns significantly transformed the city’s social and spatial structure.

The Marseille itself states that the second half of the 20th century saw the erosion of industry and port activity, with a significant share of port operations shifting toward Fos-sur-Mer and Étang de Berre—it’s shifting approximately 50 km from Marseille.

Large residential complexes emerged on the outskirts of Marseille, concentrating disadvantaged or newly arrived populations with lower incomes. Over time, this created a very pronounced difference between some of the southern and northern parts of the city.

According to INSEE (Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques), Marseille had a total population of 877,215 in 2022. Of these, 141,554 people were classified as immigrants, meaning people born abroad regardless of their current citizenship. This represented 16.1% of the population. There were 104,141 foreign nationals, or 11.9%. Overall, this means that roughly one third of the city’s population has a foreign-born or foreign-national background when these categories are considered together.

The figure of 16.1% also does not represent the share of everyone with an immigrant background. For example, it does not include people born in France whose parents were born abroad. The actual number of residents with an immigrant background is therefore higher.

Marseille also is not a city that visitors have abandoned either. The official tourism office reports approximately 5 million visitors per year. Tourists are predominantly French — around 70% — while international visitors account for roughly 30%. In 2025, the destination recorded more than 19.9 million tourist overnight stays. These figures refer to the Marseille destination as a whole, not only to its southern coastal areas. 

Algeria is by far the largest international source market for tourist overnight stays in Marseille, accounting for 24% of all international overnight stays, or approximately 1.5 million nights. Germany follows with 12%, while the United States ranks third with 10%. But the unusually high proportion of visitors from Algeria has primarily historical and family-related reasons. Marseille has been connected to Algeria for more than a century, including throughout the period of French colonial rule in Algeria, through its port, trade, migration, and close economic and social ties. After the Algerian War and Algeria’s independence in 1962, these connections became even stronger, particularly through subsequent migration and the development of extensive family ties between the two countries. For many Algerians, therefore, a trip to Marseille may not mean a conventional tourist holiday. It may involve visiting relatives and friends, a longer family stay, or a combination of visiting family and tourism.

 Violence Connected to the Criminal Environment

Then comes the statistic that helps explain why Marseille is so frequently mentioned in discussions about security.

In Marseille, 165 murders and attempted murders involving people from criminal circles were recorded in 2023, compared with 76 cases in 2022. This represented a year-on-year increase of 117%. (Xavier Raufer)

With a population of 877,215, 165 cases would correspond to approximately 18.8 cases per 100,000 inhabitants. Purely mathematically, that is an average of approximately one such case every 2.2 days.

It is important, however, to emphasize what this statistic actually means. These are not all murders and attempted murders committed in Marseille. They concern a specific category of violence involving perpetrators or people connected to criminal circles in Marseille.

The connection between violence and the drug market is even more striking.

The French Cour des comptes states that 47 murders connected to drug trafficking were recorded in Marseille in 2023. This represented more than nine out of ten murders recorded in the city. At the same time, 118 people were injured, compared with 43 in 2022.

Cour des comptes states said that the violence is also spreading geographically. Whereas in 2022 at least one so-called “narcocide” occurred in six of Marseille’s sixteen municipal districts, by 2023 this had risen to eleven.

Marseille is therefore not simply a story of crime. It is also a story of social segregation, poverty, and the spatial concentration of problems.

 Poverty and the Concentration of Problems

“Life is parallel to Hell, but I must maintain.” — from song N.Y. State of Mind by Nas

According to INSEE, the poverty rate in Marseille’s priority neighborhoods, known as QPVs (Quartier prioritaire de la politique de la ville), was approximately 52% in 2021. This means that roughly one in two residents of these neighborhoods lived below the poverty line.

Some of the city’s most significant social problems are concentrated precisely in these areas.

There is another interesting mechanism at work here. INSEE data show that within the Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur region, people are moving away from priority neighborhoods, particularly in the Aix-Marseille-Provence area. Those leaving these areas have, on average, a higher standard of living than those moving into them.

This creates a fairly important problem.

If people with higher living standards are disproportionately leaving a poor neighborhood while people with the lowest incomes, people living in poverty, and people without income remain, the departure of residents does not necessarily solve the problem. On the contrary, it can lead to an even greater concentration of poverty.

And this is where Marseille becomes an interesting example. A example because this situation can be to see also at another problematic parts of France.

There are neighborhoods in Marseille where large numbers of people with low incomes, people living in poverty, and people without income live. A significant proportion of the population has an immigrant background or was born in another country, while many of their descendants were born directly in France. Immigrant background itself, however, is obviously not an explanation for crime. What matters above all is the environment in which poverty, unemployment, limited economic opportunities, social segregation, and the presence of an organized drug market combine.

What happens if the economic conditions of such a neighborhood deteriorate further, or if it becomes increasingly marginalized?

The intuitive answer might be: people will leave and the problem will therefore be solved. But Marseille itself shows why this does not necessarily work.

The French Ministry of the Interior states that in 2024, registered drug-related crime in QPVs was higher than in their immediate surroundings. For drug use, there were 10.1 suspects per 1,000 inhabitants compared with 5.0 outside QPVs. The difference was even greater for drug trafficking: 3.2 compared with 0.8 per 1,000 inhabitants. These figures concern QPVs across France, not Marseille alone, but they demonstrate a significant spatial concentration of this type of crime.

This may point to a mechanism in which individual social problems reinforce one another.

Poverty limits people’s ability to improve their living conditions. Those who have sufficient resources and opportunities may be able to leave a troubled neighborhood. Those who do not have such options remain. If a drug market and organized criminal groups are also present in the same area, crime may become further concentrated there.

As the history of Marseille itself shows, people throughout history have generally not simply left when conditions deteriorated.

The departure of part of the population therefore does not necessarily mean that a neighborhood will recover. It may instead mean that those with the greatest ability to change their circumstances are the ones who leave, while a higher concentration of people with low or no income and limited opportunities remains behind.

And this is precisely what makes Marseille such an interesting example of this mechanism. Parts of its industry once disappeared, but the people remained. Later, those with better opportunities began to leave. Some of the city’s poorest areas were therefore gradually left with a high concentration of people who had the fewest opportunities to change their circumstances.

Marseille is therefore not simply a story of crime. It is also a story of how economic decline, social segregation, poverty, the departure of part of the population, and the development of an illegal economy can become interconnected within the same urban space.