The French Culture of Intense Protest

 I am certainly not the only person who sometimes finds it rather strange that contemporary protests in France are attributed by some people to particular ethnic groups. In my view, this is partly a matter of ignorance, partly politics, and partly simply the result of making foolish claims without understanding French culture.

In my view, 

 France

Ossuaire de Douaumont

     has a deeply rooted culture of intense protest that extends across French society as a whole. The fact that some contemporary conflicts take place in areas with high proportions of people of immigrant origin may influence the local demographic composition of those taking part in protests, but this does not in itself explain French protest culture or nationwide mobilization.

 France has a very long tradition of intense political and social mobilization. Its roots can be traced back to the French Revolution and the revolutionary and workers’ movements of the nineteenth century. Mass mobilisation and social pressure became established ways of pursuing political and social demands in France.

Very important part of this tradition is the French concept of rapport de force (1) — the idea that a social group can build up enough pressure to force change. Protest therefore does not necessarily have to be seen merely as an expression of opinion, but also as a means of negotiation and a way of shifting the balance of power.

Wars and decolonization also became part of this history. In particular, the Algerian War of 1954–1962 brought a major conflict directly into metropolitan France. Algerians living in France organised demonstrations of their own, while French society itself was deeply divided over colonialism, the war, and the future of Algeria. The events of 17 October 1961 and the Charonne station demonstration in 1962 demonstrate how dramatically tensions between the state, the police and protesters could escalate.

Even more significant was 1968.

May 1968 did not begin as a protest over immigration. It began as a student movement, but workers and other sections of French society quickly joined it. This was followed by a massive general strike involving millions of employees, according to historical estimates. The protests affected universities, factories, schools and public spaces across the country. The concerns of that generation also included the Vietnam War, authority, working conditions and broader demands for social change.

This history is important for understanding France today.

French protest culture is not something that immigration brought into the country, as is sometimes suggested.

The French police and government themselves are not claiming that migrants are the driving force behind the current protests. In fact, their current claim is quite different: that the mobilization is being driven or exploited by the radical left, particularly LFI (La France insoumise) and certain student and trade union organizations.

To French protest culture, immigrants and their descendants could instead gradually become part of an already established French culture of protest, just as they could become involved in many other areas of French social and political life.

Contemporary protests may therefore have their own specific social, economic or political causes, but the mere fact that protests in France can become highly intense or even violent is nothing new. It is part of a much longer historical development. French people can sometimes look like an abolitionists in their approach to political and social issues.

It is also reasonable to assume that if France were directly attacked, its strong tradition of collective mobilization and historical memory of the Resistance could contribute to civilian resistance, rather than leaving the defense of the country exclusively to the armed forces.

In this respect, as in many others, the French experience can provide useful examples. In some societies, people may not even recognize the systematic erosion of their capacity for a war crimes and other serious abuses. In a society such as France, however, rather than once again taking a similar approach, it is reasonable to expect much stronger resistance. 

In conclusion, from a historical and cultural perspective, the French culture of intense protest or resistance is a phenomenon that is deeply rooted throughout French society.

————————— >

 (1) “Rapport de force” is a French expression meaning a balance of power between opposing parties. It describes a situation in which two or more sides have conflicting interests and use their respective forms of power or leverage to influence the outcome.

In other words, a rapport de force is essentially about who has greater leverage and how that leverage affects the outcome.

For example, in a labour dispute, striking garbage collectors may have considerable bargaining power because stopping waste collection can have an immediate impact on everyday life. Similarly, a public-transport strike can create significant pressure because of its effect on society.

The concept also applies to politics. The French approach gives examples such as the Liberation of France, when the political forces emerging from the Resistance were strong enough to push through major social and economic reforms, or the feminist movements of the 1970s, which gained enough political influence to contribute to the legalization of abortion.

In simple terms, rapport de force describes who has greater leverage in a conflict or negotiation, how that power is used, and how the balance between the opposing sides can change over time.

In other words, “rapport de force” means that an action is not merely an expression of disagreement, but a means of putting pressure on the other side.

——————— >

The French government has acknowledged that the students’ discontent is real…

On 7 October, Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu said that “the anger of young people does not come from nowhere” and that nobody could remain indifferent to the anxieties they are expressing. Lecornu referred to the broader concerns affecting the younger generation and stressed the government’s responsibility to listen to them and rebuild their trust. 

The protests have also grown beyond the students themselves, attracting teachers, parents, trade unionists and other members of the public. What began as a student-led movement has therefore developed into a broader wave of public support around concerns about education and public services.

On 7 October, the government also had announced five areas of work in response to the mobilization, including replacing missing teachers, improving school facilities, the organization of school hours, and greater transparency in Parcoursup. The first concrete decisions are expected to be presented by the end of October.

In a note of this article about a French approach’s, the protests also can illustrate the French idea of rapport de force—the use of collective strength to create enough leverage to make those in power respond to demands they might otherwise ignore.

How Can a Country with the Highest Share of Foreign-Born Residents Also Be the Wealthiest in Europe?

 I already mentioned Luxembourg in article, Luxembourg: How Multicultural Principles Became the Foundation of the World’s Richest Country, and here is other example of an economic model in Luxembourg... 

 Luxembourg 

 offers a striking paradox in the European migration debate: more than half of its population was born abroad, yet the country has some of the highest wages and living standards in Europe.

This challenges the simple assumption that high immigration necessarily leads to economic problems, greater pressure on public services, or a decline in living standards. Luxembourg’s experience is more complicated — and potentially more instructive.

According to the latest Eurostat data, in 2025 Luxembourg was the only EU country where more than half of the population aged 15–74 had been born abroad — specifically, 56.1%.

The picture becomes even more interesting when we look at newcomers. In 2024, 85.5% of immigrants arriving in Luxembourg came from another EU country, the highest share in the entire EU.

Luxembourg City

Luxembourg is also a country with exceptionally high wages by EU standards. In 2024, the average annual full-time adjusted salary was €83,000, the highest among all EU member states. By comparison, the figure was approximately €59,600 in Belgium, €53,800 in Germany, €43,800 in France and €24,000 in Czechia.

And this is not simply about the average wage.

As of 1 June 2026, Luxembourg’s minimum wage for an unskilled worker is €2,771.33 gross per month, while the minimum wage for a skilled worker reaches €3,325.59.

Luxembourg also represents an economic model in which the “economy” is not about trying to force people living on the margins or on social benefits to survive on minimum incomes while facing living costs.

Immigrants are not merely a cost. They are also part of the economy.

That may be the most important point of the Luxembourg example.

An immigrant is not simply someone who uses public services. They are also a worker, consumer, tenant, entrepreneur, taxpayer, and someone who contributes to economic output.

In Luxembourg, this mechanism is visible almost textbook-style.

Foreign workers enable companies to fill positions that the country’s small domestic population would not be able to cover on its own.

And cross-border workers even allow Luxembourg to attract labour without requiring all of these people to live in the country.

Imagine source: Luxembourg Times

The result is an economy that is exceptionally open to foreign labour.

Luxembourg therefore offers an interesting counterexample to the simplistic assumption:

more migrants = less wealth.

Reality can be structured in precisely the opposite way.

If an economy is able to genuinely integrate foreign workers into the labour market, if there is strong demand for labour, functioning institutions, high productivity and employment, and if the state is able to generate sufficient public revenue from economic activity, foreign labour can become part of a mechanism that supports a high standard of living.

Luxembourg may seem like an extreme case: it has one of the highest rates of immigration in the European Union — and at the same time the highest average wages. It has an enormous share of foreign workers — and at the same time one of the strongest economies in the EU.

The Luxembourg experience suggests that a much more important question than “How many migrants does a country have?” may be:

“How is a country able to integrate their potential into its economy?”

And that is precisely what makes Luxembourg one of the most interesting cases in Europe.

Is No Longer a Practically Legally Tolerated Model in Western Europe

  In a way, I was expecting France to introduce measures sooner or later. France has the largest free tekno community in Europe, although not in terms of population size, as the Czechia may rank among the highest on a per-capita basis. I am among those who have strong reservations about free tekno for many serious reasons, and France has, in a way, completed the closure of Western Europe.

The legal position of the traditional free party has changed fundamentally across Western Europe. 

 An Unannounced Free Party Without Permission Is No Longer a Practically Legally Tolerated Model in Western Europe

  An unannounced free party — a music gathering organised without prior notification or permission from the authorities, typically at a location not intended for such an event — is increasingly no longer treated as something that can simply take place outside the normal legal framework.

Western European countries have different legal systems and use different mechanisms. Some require prior authorisation, others require notification or declaration, while others give police extensive powers to disperse unauthorised gatherings and seize equipment.

The practical result, however, is increasingly similar: the traditional model of an unannounced free party without permission is no longer a practically legally tolerated form of event organisation in Western Europe.

A Broader European Development

The change is particularly significant because the free party was historically associated with operating outside the conventional entertainment system.

Unlike a conventional festival, concert or club event, a free party could be organised without a commercial venue, without a formal promoter and without the normal administrative procedures. A sound system could arrive at an improvised location and the event could develop through informal networks.

That model increasingly conflicts with modern public-order regulation.

Authorities across Western Europe have developed mechanisms allowing them to intervene when large unauthorised music gatherings take place. These mechanisms can concern public safety, noise, traffic, environmental protection, land use, emergency access and the management of large crowds.

France Completes the Recent Shift in Western Europe

France has recently completed a broader shift that had already been visible elsewhere in Western Europe.

Since August 2026, French law has established a specific declaration regime for certain privately organised music gatherings held at places that are not equipped for such events. The relevant legal category covers gatherings expected to involve more than 250 people and meeting additional statutory conditions.

The significance of the French reform is that it brings several elements of this increasingly restrictive approach together within one explicit legal framework. The consequences of organising a qualifying gathering without the required declaration can include criminal liability, while the law also provides for the confiscation of equipment used to commit the offence under specified conditions.

Excerpt from the legislation concerning individual participants 

 A person who participates in an assembly referred to in Article L. 211-15, where the unlawful nature of that assembly has been publicly notified in accordance with the final paragraph of Article L. 211-15, is liable to a term of imprisonment of six months and a fine of €7,500. 

Criminal proceedings may, including in cases of repeat offending, be disposed of by payment of a fixed penalty of €500, subject to the conditions laid down in Articles 495-17 to 495-25 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.  

The reduced fixed penalty is €400, while the increased fixed penalty is €1,000. 

This provision also applies to foreign nationals participating in such an assembly in France. Article L. 211-15-4 contains no exemption for foreign nationals and does not make liability conditional upon French citizenship or residence in France. 

Excerpt from Sanction 

 A person who directly or indirectly contributes to the preparation, organisation, holding or conduct of an assembly referred to in Article L. 211-5 is liable to a term of imprisonment of two years and a fine of €30,000.

Most significantly, the French legislation also introduced a specific offence concerning participation when the illegal nature of the gathering has been publicly announced in accordance with the law.

France therefore represents the most recent major step in a development that has been visible across Western Europe for years. The United Kingdom had already established specific legal powers against certain free raves in the 1990s, while the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg have developed their own mechanisms for dealing with unauthorised gatherings.

What France has done recently is bring several of these elements together in a particularly explicit statutory framework. The result is that the traditional unannounced free-party model now faces a much more clearly defined legal barrier in one of the countries historically associated with Europe’s free-party and sound-system culture.

The Same Principle Exists Elsewhere

The United Kingdom has had specific legal powers concerning raves since the 1990s. The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 allows police, under defined circumstances, to intervene against certain gatherings involving amplified music and to seize sound equipment.

The Netherlands has a different legal system, but Dutch police also regularly intervene against illegal rave parties. Police can stop unauthorised events and seize equipment or generators.

Belgium demonstrates another form of the same development. Municipal and local police regulations can require prior authorisation for outdoor rave or free parties, and some local regulations explicitly prohibit them.

Luxembourg has also demonstrated that an unauthorised rave can result not only in the dissolution of the event but also in the seizure of sound equipment and vehicles used to transport it.

For example, in July 2025, Luxembourg police dealt with an unauthorised rave party in the Heinerscheid area. Approximately 500 people were present, and the event was taking place in a nature-protection area. The authorities decided to dissolve the event.

Most importantly for the free-party model, the police reported that all stage and sound equipment used to organise the event, as well as the vehicles used to transport it, were seized on the order of the Diekirch public prosecutor in connection with violations of nature-protection legislation.

It does demonstrate that an unauthorised rave taking place outside the established regulatory framework can lead to a serious police and prosecutorial response.

Different Laws, Similar Practical Boundary

The legal systems of France, Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg are not identical. Their definitions, thresholds, administrative procedures and criminal sanctions differ considerably.

Britain has a specific statutory rave regime. France has a specific framework for certain “rassemblements festifs à caractère musical”, with particularly strong new sanctions since August 2026. Belgium relies substantially on local and municipal regulation. The Netherlands uses a broader system of public-order and criminal-law powers. Luxembourg can combine public-order, environmental and other legal provisions.

But from the perspective of someone organising a traditional free party, the practical boundary is remarkably similar:

Once a party is deliberately organised without notifying or obtaining the required approval from the authorities, without the required permission to use the location, and outside a legally authorised event framework, the organisers cannot normally assume that the state will simply tolerate it.

The End of a Legally Tolerated Model

The classic free-party formula — an improvised location, no prior authorisation, no notification to the authorities, a sound system and a large crowd — has progressively lost the legal space it once occupied.

Structural Deficits? in a French City

 I have already written about the French region of Grand Est as one of the places in France that made a good impression on me, based partly on my own experiences. I generally do not like writing about places I do not know personally, but this time I decided to take a closer look at another part of France — a city that is discussed exceptionally often in connection with violence, drugs, and organized crime: Marseille. I also considered how certain policies could further exacerbate these problems.

Marseille and Strasbourg, for instance, show how dramatically different cities of the same country can be, and even how different parts of a single French city can be from one another.

 Marseille: A Once-Thriving City and Its Decline

 

 Marseille is a city of contrasts. Once a prosperous Mediterranean metropolis with one of Europe’s most important ports, extensive trade, industry, and a seaside resort, it is now often associated with poverty, drug trafficking, gangs, and violence.

In some categories of violent crime, Marseille genuinely reaches the very top of French statistics, and even among the highest levels recorded in the European Union. In its report on the drug trade, the French Senate stated that in 2023 Marseille ranked first among the French cities examined in the number of murders and attempted murders committed within criminal circles.

However, Marseille does not appear to be a city where every part of its urban space is equally dangerous or socially troubled.

In the south of Marseille are beaches, the coastline, villa districts, parks, and areas that resemble a classic Mediterranean metropolis. In the north, by contrast, some of the city’s poorest neighborhoods, social problems, drug markets, and violence are concentrated.

 This difference is not accidental.

During the second half of the 20th century, Marseille underwent a major economic transformation. The decline of parts of traditional industry, changes in the port economy, the end of the colonial era, and subsequent migration patterns significantly transformed the city’s social and spatial structure.

The Marseille itself states that the second half of the 20th century saw the erosion of industry and port activity, with a significant share of port operations shifting toward Fos-sur-Mer and Étang de Berre—it’s shifting approximately 50 km from Marseille.

Large residential complexes emerged on the outskirts of Marseille, concentrating disadvantaged or newly arrived populations with lower incomes. Over time, this created a very pronounced difference between some of the southern and northern parts of the city.

According to INSEE (Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques), Marseille had a total population of 877,215 in 2022. Of these, 141,554 people were classified as immigrants, meaning people born abroad regardless of their current citizenship. This represented 16.1% of the population. There were 104,141 foreign nationals, or 11.9%. Overall, this means that roughly one third of the city’s population has a foreign-born or foreign-national background when these categories are considered together.

The figure of 16.1% also does not represent the share of everyone with an immigrant background. For example, it does not include people born in France whose parents were born abroad. The actual number of residents with an immigrant background is therefore higher.

Marseille also is not a city that visitors have abandoned either. The official tourism office reports approximately 5 million visitors per year. Tourists are predominantly French — around 70% — while international visitors account for roughly 30%. In 2025, the destination recorded more than 19.9 million tourist overnight stays. These figures refer to the Marseille destination as a whole, not only to its southern coastal areas. 

Algeria is by far the largest international source market for tourist overnight stays in Marseille, accounting for 24% of all international overnight stays, or approximately 1.5 million nights. Germany follows with 12%, while the United States ranks third with 10%. But the unusually high proportion of visitors from Algeria has primarily historical and family-related reasons. Marseille has been connected to Algeria for more than a century, including throughout the period of French colonial rule in Algeria, through its port, trade, migration, and close economic and social ties. After the Algerian War and Algeria’s independence in 1962, these connections became even stronger, particularly through subsequent migration and the development of extensive family ties between the two countries. For many Algerians, therefore, a trip to Marseille may not mean a conventional tourist holiday. It may involve visiting relatives and friends, a longer family stay, or a combination of visiting family and tourism.

 Violence Connected to the Criminal Environment

Then comes the statistic that helps explain why Marseille is so frequently mentioned in discussions about security.

In Marseille, 165 murders and attempted murders involving people from criminal circles were recorded in 2023, compared with 76 cases in 2022. This represented a year-on-year increase of 117%. (Xavier Raufer)

With a population of 877,215, 165 cases would correspond to approximately 18.8 cases per 100,000 inhabitants. Purely mathematically, that is an average of approximately one such case every 2.2 days.

It is important, however, to emphasize what this statistic actually means. These are not all murders and attempted murders committed in Marseille. They concern a specific category of violence involving perpetrators or people connected to criminal circles in Marseille.

The connection between violence and the drug market is even more striking.

The French Cour des comptes states that 47 murders connected to drug trafficking were recorded in Marseille in 2023. This represented more than nine out of ten murders recorded in the city. At the same time, 118 people were injured, compared with 43 in 2022.

Cour des comptes states said that the violence is also spreading geographically. Whereas in 2022 at least one so-called “narcocide” occurred in six of Marseille’s sixteen municipal districts, by 2023 this had risen to eleven.

Marseille is therefore not simply a story of crime. It is also a story of social segregation, poverty, and the spatial concentration of problems.

 Poverty and the Concentration of Problems

“Life is parallel to Hell, but I must maintain.” — from song N.Y. State of Mind by Nas

According to INSEE, the poverty rate in Marseille’s priority neighborhoods, known as QPVs (Quartier prioritaire de la politique de la ville), was approximately 52% in 2021. This means that roughly one in two residents of these neighborhoods lived below the poverty line.

Some of the city’s most significant social problems are concentrated precisely in these areas.

There is another interesting mechanism at work here. INSEE data show that within the Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur region, people are moving away from priority neighborhoods, particularly in the Aix-Marseille-Provence area. Those leaving these areas have, on average, a higher standard of living than those moving into them.

This creates a fairly important problem.

If people with higher living standards are disproportionately leaving a poor neighborhood while people with the lowest incomes, people living in poverty, and people without income remain, the departure of residents does not necessarily solve the problem. On the contrary, it can lead to an even greater concentration of poverty.

And this is where Marseille becomes an interesting example. A example because this situation can be to see also at another problematic parts of France.

There are neighborhoods in Marseille where large numbers of people with low incomes, people living in poverty, and people without income live. A significant proportion of the population has an immigrant background or was born in another country, while many of their descendants were born directly in France. Immigrant background itself, however, is obviously not an explanation for crime. What matters above all is the environment in which poverty, unemployment, limited economic opportunities, social segregation, and the presence of an organized drug market combine.

What happens if the economic conditions of such a neighborhood deteriorate further, or if it becomes increasingly marginalized?

The intuitive answer might be: people will leave and the problem will therefore be solved. But Marseille itself shows why this does not necessarily work.

The French Ministry of the Interior states that in 2024, registered drug-related crime in QPVs was higher than in their immediate surroundings. For drug use, there were 10.1 suspects per 1,000 inhabitants compared with 5.0 outside QPVs. The difference was even greater for drug trafficking: 3.2 compared with 0.8 per 1,000 inhabitants. These figures concern QPVs across France, not Marseille alone, but they demonstrate a significant spatial concentration of this type of crime.

This may point to a mechanism in which individual social problems reinforce one another.

Poverty limits people’s ability to improve their living conditions. Those who have sufficient resources and opportunities may be able to leave a troubled neighborhood. Those who do not have such options remain. If a drug market and organized criminal groups are also present in the same area, crime may become further concentrated there.

As the history of Marseille itself shows, people throughout history have generally not simply left when conditions deteriorated.

The departure of part of the population therefore does not necessarily mean that a neighborhood will recover. It may instead mean that those with the greatest ability to change their circumstances are the ones who leave, while a higher concentration of people with low or no income and limited opportunities remains behind.

And this is precisely what makes Marseille such an interesting example of this mechanism. Parts of its industry once disappeared, but the people remained. Later, those with better opportunities began to leave. Some of the city’s poorest areas were therefore gradually left with a high concentration of people who had the fewest opportunities to change their circumstances.

Marseille is therefore not simply a story of crime. It is also a story of how economic decline, social segregation, poverty, the departure of part of the population, and the development of an illegal economy can become interconnected within the same urban space.

These places of a best quality of life

 Because of my experiences in places such as Dutch cities, I often find myself wondering how easily people’s origins or ethnic diversity can be turned into an arguments that such a society cannot function, or that it must inevitably be less safe—for me, these arguments are a nonsense. My experience in the Netherlands has been the opposite. Some of my favorite places in Europe are also places with exceptionally diverse populations.

One of them is the province of Zuid-Holland, which I have mentioned several times before. This is where Rotterdam, The Hague and many other beautiful cities are located. Zuid-Holland (South Holland) as a whole is a beautiful place and is often among the leading places in Europe and in the world when it comes to quality of life—also according to the current Numbeo ranking, cities in this province are also among the top ten cities in the world for Quality of Life.

This time, however, I do not want to focus on the entire province—although this reality is similar to Zuid-Holland as whole. I want to focus on one particular place that, in my opinion, illustrates very well just how diverse contemporary European society can be — Rotterdam-Zuid.

 Rotterdam-Zuid 

is generally one of the most ethnically and culturally diverse parts of the city.

The Dutch statistical office CBS records statistics and these statistics show just how exceptionally diverse some of the neighborhoods here are.

For example, in Afrikaanderwijk, only 17% of residents had a Dutch background in 2025, while 74% had a background outside Europe and approximately another 9% had a European background outside the Netherlands. Put simply, around three quarters of the residents of this neighbourhood have a non-European background.

A similar picture can be seen in Hillesluis, where people with a non-European background accounted for approximately 71% of the population in 2025. Around 15% had a Dutch background, while another 14% had a European background outside the Netherlands.

In Tarwewijk, only 18% of residents had a Dutch background in 2025. 57% had a non-European background and another 25% had a European background outside the Netherlands.

These figures illustrate quite well just how dramatically the demographic composition can differ between different parts of the same European city.

Rotterdam-Zuid as a whole has a very visible Black population, partly due to communities with Surinamese, Caribbean, Cape Verdean and Sub-Saharan African backgrounds. At the same time, there are also large communities with Turkish, Moroccan, Muslim and many other backgrounds.

So when a man walk through Afrikaanderwijk, Hillesluis, Bloemhof, Tarwewijk or Feijenoord, a one encounter people with roots in many different parts of the world — Sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean, South America, Turkey, Morocco, and other parts of Asia and Europe.

And in my opinion, this combination is precisely what characterises Rotterdam-Zuid.

 Rotterdam-Zuid as a multicultural space

This diversity is also evident when looking at Rotterdam as a whole. According to 2025 figures, approximately 248,000 residents of Rotterdam had a Dutch background, 80,000 had a European background outside the Netherlands, and 281,000 had a non-European background.

National statistics also show that Rotterdam, together with Amsterdam and The Hague, is among the Dutch cities with a very high proportion of residents with non-European backgrounds. In 2024, people with a non-European background accounted for just over 40% of Rotterdam’s population.

And Rotterdam-Zuid contains some neighbourhoods where this proportion is even higher.

Yet Rotterdam remains one city, one society and one shared everyday public space in which a very high level of ethnic diversity exists. For me, this diversity is one of the things that makes Rotterdam such a fascinating and enjoyable place — together with its highly modern architecture, interesting history and constantly changing society.

For me, Rotterdam-Zuid is therefore one of the most interesting examples of how extraordinary cultural and ethnic diversity does not, in itself, mean that a society cannot function. And this highly diverse part of Rotterdam-Zuid lies directly next to one of the city’s most modern, international, and one of the most popular areas — Kop van Zuid.

Quite the opposite — Rotterdam shows how a highly diverse population can simply be a natural part of everyday life. Rotterdam exists because of this very diverse society. 

How I said in the start of this article, no one can convince me that such a society cannot function, or that it must be unsafe. 

Camp Fire /\ wildfires in France

 Yesterday I watched the film The Lost Bus 2025, which depicts the true events of the Camp Fire in California in 2018, when the fire hit the town of Paradise.

The film was very tense, and after watching it I became curious to see how this event actually compares with the extensive wildfires in France this year.

The comparison in terms of the area burned is interesting in itself. The Camp Fire in California ultimately burned approximately 62,000 hectares. The enormous wildfire in Gironde this year affected approximately 40,000 hectares, about two-thirds of the area burned by the Camp Fire. And when all the wildfires in France this year are taken together, approximately 72,000 hectares had been burned by mid-September.

The Lost Bus movie 2025

But the scale of the Camp Fire was not just about the area burned. The fire quickly affected the communities of Concow, Paradise and Magalia, triggering the evacuation of around 40,000 people. Paradise itself had a population of approximately 26,700 before the fire. The Camp Fire ultimately claimed 85 civilian lives and destroyed more than 18,000 structures.

“Every year, the fires get bigger. And there’s more of them. We’re being damn fools. That’s the truth.”, said Fire Chief Martinez (Yul Vazquez)

The Camp Fire also had a very specific character. It was not simply one continuous fire front moving through the landscape. The fire was caused by a failure in the power lines, and strong winds then carried burning embers far ahead of the main fire front. This caused additional spot fires to break out in Paradise before the main body of the fire had even arrived.

I think this is exactly what the film captures so well. There was not simply one clearly defined fire front in front of people; the fire could suddenly appear in different places all around them. Some of these spot fires were several kilometers ahead of the main front.

And this is where the comparison with this year’s fires in France becomes interesting. The French fires were enormous in terms of their overall area, and some of them spread extremely quickly, but the Camp Fire illustrates a somewhat different type of danger: an extremely fast-moving fire that, through burning embers, was able to “jump” across parts of the landscape and start new fires directly within populated areas.

After watching the film, I was therefore surprised that the difference in the actual area burned is not all that large. A single wildfire in California managed to burn approximately 62,000 hectares, while the total area burned by wildfires in France this year is expected to be around 72,000 hectares.

But it is precisely the way the Camp Fire spread that gives the film its extraordinary tension. It is not just a story about a huge wildfire. It is a story about a situation in which fire suddenly appears all around you, and the time you have to make a decision is measured in minutes. 

A comment: The railway sabotage incidents in the Netherlands

 I was looking at the locations of the railway sabotage incidents in the Netherlands, and I have to admit that some of them surprised me.

Without going into too much detail, what I find somewhat surprising is that the locations do not seem to involve the more heavily used southern railway corridors, including routes used for international connections, by people entering the Netherlands from other countries, or by visitors traveling to and in the main destinations in the Netherlands.

Some of the locations therefore seem rather unusual to me. It is not entirely clear why these particular parts of the Netherlands appear to have been targeted, as they seem to me to be much more closely associated with domestic rail traffic.

Major routes around Eindhoven, Breda, Tilburg and South Holland, as well as the Eindhoven–Amsterdam corridor and several other important connections, do not appear to have been affected. I would think that even more remote sections of these lines could potentially have been vulnerable.

This is particularly interesting when considering international movement into the Netherlands. People travelling from the eastern parts of Europe via Germany generally enter the country through its southern and eastern approaches when heading towards South Holland or further north towards Amsterdam. People travelling from other parts of the Benelux, as well as from France and southern Europe, also tend to use the southern parts of the Dutch railway network, especially when traveling to major destinations such as South Holland, Amsterdam or Utrecht.

The international movement is therefore concentrated largely along routes that do not appear to have been affected. These include connections between Eindhoven and South Holland, South Holland itself, the coastal area, Amsterdam and other major destinations. There are similar international movements on routes connecting the Netherlands with the other Benelux countries, France and the United Kingdom.

ProRail identifies Amsterdam–Eindhoven, Breda–Eindhoven, Schiphol–Utrecht–Nijmegen and Rijswijk–Rotterdam, among others, as major high-frequency passenger corridors. At the same time, Amsterdam, Schiphol, Rotterdam and Breda are important nodes in international rail transport. Eurostar, for example, runs from Amsterdam via Schiphol and Rotterdam to Belgium, with international services continuing from there towards France and the UK.

And if I leave these busier southern routes aside, Venlo is also quite an important point in this analysis. It is not simply a “German direction”, but an important eastern gateway between the Dutch railway network and the Düsseldorf/Mönchengladbach area.

Amsterdam–Venlo–Düsseldorf is an established international rail connection. NS International lists it as an alternative route between Amsterdam, Venlo, Düsseldorf and Frankfurt. From Venlo, regional trains continue directly to Mönchengladbach, Düsseldorf and Hamm.

There is also a rail connection between Rotterdam and Düsseldorf, meaning that South Holland is connected to Düsseldorf as well.

At the same time, there is a direct ICE service from Amsterdam to Düsseldorf via Utrecht and Arnhem, so Düsseldorf is connected to the Netherlands through more than one corridor.

I may be missing something in my reasoning, and I am not claiming that this analysis is necessarily correct. But if the objective was to cause as much disruption as possible to the Dutch railway network, my question would be why these busiest and most internationally relevant corridors were largely left untouched, while the infrastructure that was targeted appears, at least to me, to be more closely associated with a specific domestic rail traffic.

In other words, if the intention really was “to cause as much disruption as possible to the Dutch railway network”, it seems to me that this could be true especially for a particular part of the Netherlands, rather than for the Dutch railway network as a whole. 

German people must really like South Holland

 During the summer seasons, when I visit The Hague, I notice that I often see people from Germany. If I don’t see a Dutch license plate, I also often see German license plates in the car parks by the sea. 

I also notice people from Germany in places in Rotterdam. 

In my opinion, people from Germany like South Holland for similar reasons to why I like this part of the world. 

And because I was convinced that people from Germany are perhaps among the largest groups of visitors to The Hague, I looked up the statistics.

And I laughed…

The statistics confirm my assumption. The data from The Hague & Partners show that guests from Germany are the second-largest group of hotel guests after guests from the Netherlands.

Dutch Younger Generations Are Usually Wealthier Than Those Before Them

 I have another report about the Netherlands…

 Somewhere it is often said that today’s younger generation is the first one that will be worse off than their parents. And maybe in some European countries this is the truth. 

Dutch data, however, paint a somewhat different picture about Dutch situation. 

A new analysis by the Dutch national statistics office, CBS, compared different generations at the same ages.

First of all, Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS) is the Dutch national statistics office and one of the most important institutions for understanding how Dutch society is actually developing. CBS was established as early as 1899, and its task is to collect, analyse, and publish reliable and independent statistical data about Dutch society and the economy.

The CBS results are fairly clear: at the same age, younger generations generally have greater purchasing power and more wealth than the generations before them.

For example, at the age of 45, the generation born between 1970 and 1985 had purchasing power almost half again as high as that of the baby boomers at the same age. Overall average purchasing power among the population also increased from €26.3 thousand in 1977 to €45.3 thousand in 2024, measured in 2024 prices.

A similar development can be seen in wealth. The median wealth of the Dutch population in 2024 was almost five times higher than in 1993. Rising property prices played a particularly important role in this.

This does not mean that young people in the Netherlands have everything easier. Up to around the age of 25–30, the youngest generations often have less money and wealth, partly because they spend longer in education. And housing in particular has become very problematic: the generation born between 1970 and 1985 has the highest rate of home ownership among the post-war generations studied.

Nevertheless, the main conclusion is this: the Netherlands is not a country where every new generation automatically falls into a worse economic situation than the one before it. On the contrary, when comparing people at the same age, the long-term trend is generally the opposite.

And that is precisely one of the reasons why the Dutch model is so interesting. It is not only about how much money people have today, but whether a society can continue to improve its standard of living over the long term, across generations. 

In a way, I perhaps can now tell the truth that this may be connected with a “porcelain eyes” that I sometimes see looking at me, or that I see them exclusively in the Benelux countries, as well I saw this among someone’s from France. This itself say a lot to me about Western Europe. 

An Islanders fun

 I have already mentioned that I am a fan of the New York Islanders. My fandom has several rather bold and also another reasons behind it. I also watch Long Island in New York from afar. And although she is originally from LA, Chloë Grace Moretz, whom I have somehow come to like, is also an Islanders fan—Chloe Moretz is valuable in her own right to me, and if I had one wish involving Chloë Moretz, it would be to go to a game at UBS Arena. Islanders is also an only one hockey about I have an interest. 

The new NHL season will begin soon. I enjoy following the Islanders, so I am curious to see what this season will bring. The Islanders are more of a middle-of-the-tab team, and sometimes it can be a little nerve-racking during the season depending on how the team is doing at the time. It is also somewhat about being a die-hard fan, because the Isles are not regularly among the NHL leaders. They last won the Stanley Cup at the beginning of the 1980s, when they won four titles in a row from 1980 to 1983.

Last year, the Islanders had their best season in recent years. They finished the regular season with a record of 43–34–5 and 91 points, which was nine points more than the previous season. At one point during the season, the Islanders were also the best team in New York, and Islanders fans joked that the Isles had taken over New York. Towards the end of the season, however, the Isles were apparently also losing some of what they had earlier in the season, perhaps because of the pressure leading up to the playoffs.

Patrick Roy also ended up leaving his position as head coach, apparently partly because of this finish. I admit that I still have mixed feelings about it, because for most of the season the team was in good positions, unlike in previous seasons. The Islanders had already improved significantly after Patrick Roy took over in January 2024, reaching the playoffs that season.

In 2025/2026 most of the season, the Islanders had their best record in several years – 42–31–5, or 89 points in 78 games. Although they ultimately failed to make the playoffs, they spent a large part of the season in playoff positions and were still third in the Metropolitan Division shortly before the end. Even new head coach changed nothing in the end of this season. 

Cocktail movie (1988)

Maybe I am being skeptical, but the Isles could possibly be even worse during 2026/2027 season than they were last year.

In other words, the Isles perhaps may have greater potential as a team in the future, especially thanks to their young players and planned financial flexibility, but this season they could easily be just as good as last year — or even slightly worse. NHL says the Islanders enter the 2026–27 season after a 43–34–5 record and without making the playoffs.

 I have already written that, in my opinion, it is also justified that the Netherlands was chosen by people as Best Quality of Life 2026 in the Numbeo ranking. The reasons why this happened are certainly also connected to the Dutch system.

I almost do not even want to publish this—many people may not be aware of these Dutch advantages. However, I would publish it for those who see a problem with very liberal societies…

Dutch society demonstrates that a very liberal society can be resilient and also safe precisely on the basis of its liberal values.

This topic is terrible when it comes to a liberal societies such as the Dutch one. But when I look at the Netherlands, Dutch society, and the Dutch infrastructure in the event of a serious conflict, I see several major advantages from both a human and technological perspective.

  

 The Strength of a Liberal Society 

Photo is shared from another social medias. 

   The Netherlands represents an example of a very liberal society that is exceptionally proactive and also has the potential to be resilient in the event of conflicts of the most serious kind, including a war.

Dutch initiative is not limited to business and the economy. It is also reflected in the emphasis on individual rights, humanism, civil society, very high-quality and strong infrastructure, efficient public services, economic development, and the ability to solve problems in practical ways.

Dutch society has a strong tendency to actively organize, improve, and adapt things on its own. When a high level of quality does not meet expectations, there is an emphasis on institutions to ensure that what is required is provided.

These Dutch characteristics can also be significant in the event of a serious crisis or armed conflict.

The Netherlands also has very good material foundations for ensuring basic needs. It has exceptionally productive agriculture, diverse farming, and is one of the world’s most important food exporters.

The Netherlands is therefore creating a very strong foundation for food resilience.

In terms of electricity generation, the Netherlands has significant domestic electricity production capacity. It not only produces electricity for its own consumption, but is also a net exporter of electricity. The fact that it imports electricity from neighboring countries at certain times cannot be interpreted as an inability to meet its own consumption—it is rather a consequence of the advantages of the market.

A significant advantage is the decentralization of energy production in the Netherlands. In renewable electricity generation, the Netherlands is among the leaders. It has a very large number of solar installations, including on individual homes, as well as extensive wind power capacity. Energy is not produced primarily in a few large power plants, but rather across many geographically dispersed locations.

Such infrastructure can be advantageous from a resilience perspective. The loss of a single large generation facility does not necessarily mean the loss of a comparable amount of generation capacity, as it might in a system based primarily on a few large centralized sources, compared with a system relying on highly dispersed sources across the country, including widely distributed decentralized wind generation or a individual solar panels at homes. 

Decentralized electricity generation can also increase the flexibility of the system and make it easier to gradually restore it after disruption.

Public transport also operates to a very significant extent on this infrastructure. Transport such as railways is electrified, as are metros and, in many cases, urban and suburban public transport systems as a whole.

Electromobility fits into the same concept. The Netherlands is one of the strong supporters of electric mobility. If transport is increasingly powered by domestic electricity generated from wind, solar, and other sources, the need to import oil and distribute fuels through relatively centralized infrastructure is reduced.

Electric vehicles also represent a potentially significant distributed battery-storage capacity. This could help balance fluctuations between electricity generation and consumption, and potentially provide part of that energy back to the grid or local infrastructure.

For current normal state electricity consumption in the Netherlands, the CBS quarterly data are precise: 18.446 TWh from renewables out of 27.307 TWh of net consumption, meaning that the Dutch renewables cover 67.55% of consumption.

When it comes to technology, it is also worth mentioning that thanks to ASML, the Netherlands has a practically monopolistic position in EUV lithography—precisely the technology that is critical for manufacturing the most advanced semiconductors.

The Netherlands does not need to be completely self-sufficient in the sense of being isolated from the outside world. Its strength lies rather in the combination of social initiative, economic performance, very high-quality and strong infrastructure, the ability to meet basic needs such as domestic food production, and high and extensively decentralized electricity generation.

In my opinion, it is precisely this combination within a very liberal Dutch society that creates a high degree of resilience and energy autonomy, including in the event of extensive disruption to the normal functioning of society. 

Strasbourg vs. Amsterdam

 Perhaps this opinion of mine will surprise some people.

 Most people associate canals and a beautiful historic city center with Amsterdam in the Netherlands. And the truth is that Amsterdam’s historic center is beautiful. For me, Amsterdam is at its best during Christmas. The combination of Amsterdam’s culture, architecture, Christmas decorations, and people creates a genuinely magical Christmas atmosphere. In my opinion, Amsterdam at Christmas is easily among the most beautiful cities in Europe.

However, I also have to mention Strasbourg in France. Strasbourg is city of French Grand Est and this city can compete with Amsterdam in many ways.

Strasbourg has a beautiful historic center, with numerous picturesque canals running through the city, much like Amsterdam. It is also particularly beautiful during the Christmas season. Cycling is also very common in Strasbourg.

What makes Strasbourg stand out for me is also its Christmas decoration. Much of it is unique and, in some cases, even has a historic or non-commercial character. The decorations are everywhere, creating a distinctive Christmas atmosphere that is difficult to find elsewhere.

For me, Strasbourg is one of the most beautiful cities in Europe. I sometimes find myself comparing it with Amsterdam, particularly when it comes to their historic centers. Strasbourg’s historic center shares surprisingly similar characteristics with Amsterdam’s, especially its combination of historic architecture, canals, and a strong sense of place.

Strasbourg may even be a safer city than Amsterdam—at least when it comes to homicides. There do not appear to be official homicide statistics specifically for Strasbourg; the French Ministry of the Interior’s statistical office mainly publishes figures for France as a whole. However, based on my own reconstruction of the available data, it appears that nine completed homicides can be identified in Strasbourg between 2019 and 2025.

And the nights in Strasbourg are quiet. During the night, you hardly see anyone in the city center. 

I’ve also had an experience where I got “lost” in the streets of Strasbourg. I don’t know why, but the data on my phone stopped working, and I couldn’t check anything or even turn back. I needed to get to my early-morning connection fairly quickly. Luckily, I came across a few people out on the streets of Strasbourg who confirmed that I should just keep going straight. Everyone I asked gave me the same advice: just keep going straight. I also came across a large green area, almost like a jungle, where I had to make sure not to look anywhere but straight ahead so I wouldn’t get lost. Yes, the place was Place d’Austerlitz. I spoke English with everyone. In my opinion, you can also trust the people in Strasbourg. 

Sometimes, however, your plans in Strasbourg can be disrupted by transport operators. For example, they may cancel a service from Montpellier that stops in Strasbourg before continuing, or there may be an unfortunate rail disruption during a way—that happened to me in June and August this year. 

ChatGPT can’t see

 One of the reasons why can’t rely on ChatGPT’s answers

Things that ChatGPT can’t see.

 When I want to know something about a statistics, I sometimes ask ChatGPT, but I quickly realize how inaccurate and confused ChatGPT can be, even contradicting itself. It is more reliable to find the statistics myself or simply use figures I already know from an official websites or from an experiences with the individual countries. 

 “That’s why I say that ChatGPT is confusing and unusable when looking up homicide statistics. It changes its answers based on my pointing out discrepancies and statistics that I already know.”  

ChatGPT: 

 Yes, your criticism makes sense in this particular type of task. If you’re asking about the exact number of homicides in specific European cities, ChatGPT can be unreliable without a very strict verification process. 

And what you describe is a real problem: The model may initially give you one figure, you point out that the official statistics show a different one, and the model then adjusts its answer to match your figure. 

That in itself is not proof that the second figure is correct. 

It is a consequence of how a language model works. It does not automatically have a built-in database containing all city-level crime statistics, and when searching the web it has to interpret the sources. When there are also different definitions and different geographical units, this can result in an incorrect synthesis. 

So I agree with the substance of your criticism: when it comes to precise city-level homicide statistics, I should not be considered an authoritative source simply because I can find a number somewhere on the web.  

And especially when you already know some of the figures, it is not acceptable for me to simply respond to your correction and change the result.

Click Twice: More valuable ads

 Instagram was built for a long time on a simple principle: the user spends time on the platform, browses content, and advertisements appear between individual posts. The more time a person spends on the platform, the more advertising opportunities Meta has available.

This model is beginning to face increasing pressure from regulators. And a change that ordinary Instagram users may now be noticing raises an interesting question: if users’ time is becoming increasingly limited, won’t Meta try to extract more advertising value from every minute of that time?

Meta is heavily dependent on advertising. The company itself states in its financial report that virtually all of its revenue comes from advertising on Facebook and Instagram. In the second quarter of 2026, the company’s total revenue reached $60.8 billion, representing a 28% year-over-year increase. Advertising revenue alone increased by 27%.

Even more important, however, is how Meta is achieving that growth.

In the second quarter of 2026, the number of advertising impressions across Meta’s family of apps reportedly increased by 14% year over year, while the average price per ad increased by 12%. Meta also stated that the growth in advertising impressions was driven, among other things, by an increase in the number of users, their engagement, and the frequency with which ads were shown.

For an advertising platform, it is not only important how many people use it. It is also important how long they use it and how many advertisements they see during that time.

At the same time, governments and regulators are increasingly pushing for restrictions on children’s and teenagers’ use of social media.

A particularly significant example emerged just now. On 26 August 2026, Meta reached a broad agreement with nearly all U.S. states in disputes concerning the safety and addictive nature of Facebook and Instagram for young users. The agreement reportedly includes, among other things, a default two-hour daily limit, nighttime restrictions between midnight and 6 a.m., and additional limitations on notifications and platform use. Among American teenagers aged 13–17, approximately 61% reportedly use Instagram.

The American law/settlement itself is unlikely to dramatically threaten Meta’s overall advertising revenue, because it applies only to U.S. users aged 13–17. However, it represents an important precedent. If similar restrictions expand to other countries and age groups, the economic significance of users’ lost time could become much greater.

This is not an isolated American case. Regulation of young people’s access to social media is expanding in other countries as well. Australia, for example, became the first country in the world to introduce a ban on social media for users under the age of 16, while similar proposals and debates are also taking place across Europe and other parts of the world.

If a particular group of users is allowed to spend less time on Instagram, or is prevented from using the platform altogether, the number of opportunities to show advertisements to that group naturally decreases.

Meta itself reportedly warns in its financial documents that an increasing number of laws are restricting or prohibiting the provision of its services to younger users, and that regulatory changes may affect its advertising business.

In recent weeks, some Instagram users have noticed another change. As of today, these notifications are appearing for more users. Advertisements have begun appearing directly in the Following tab—the section of the app traditionally used to browse content from accounts that users actually follow.

For a long time, Following was seen as a way to avoid part of the algorithmically recommended content and focus only on accounts that a person had personally chosen to follow.

Imagine a user who previously spent two hours a day on Instagram. During those two hours, they might have seen a certain number of advertisements. If regulation or parental controls reduce that usage to one hour, Meta suddenly has only half the amount of time in which it can display ads to that user.

Increasing the frequency of advertisements is one of the factors Meta itself mentions when explaining the growth in advertising impressions.

Meta competes for the user’s attention. Attention can be monetized through advertising. If the regulatory environment attempts to reduce the amount of that attention, its economic value to the platform may actually increase. Every minute of usage becomes more valuable. It then becomes logical to search for new advertising spaces, improve the efficiency of the advertising system, increase advertising prices, or display more ads within the same amount of time.

Indeed, in the second quarter of 2026, Meta simultaneously recorded a 14% increase in advertising impressions and a 12% increase in the average price per advertisement. Advertising revenue therefore grew significantly faster than the number of daily active people itself, which increased by only 3% year over year.

This suggests that the growth of Meta’s advertising business is not based solely on acquiring more users. Regulation may have a paradoxical effect. Regulators want people—especially children and teenagers—to spend less time on social media. Meta, on the other hand, has an economic incentive to maximize the value of users’ time, because advertising is its primary source of revenue.

The result does not necessarily have to be fewer advertisements. It may be exactly the opposite: less user time is greater pressure to monetize every minute → more advertising impressions is higher advertising density

It can therefore be argued that all of these developments are acting on the same economic issue: how much attention Meta can obtain from the user, and how much of that attention it can convert into advertising revenue.

If the world truly continues limiting the amount of time that young people, for example, are allowed to spend on social media, it may eventually turn out that the biggest change to Instagram will not be less social media—but a higher value placed on every minute that users still spend there.

A main source: Meta’s Q2 2026 Financial Report — Advertising Revenue and Ad Impressions

A inspiration for tittle "Click Twice" is song with "Click Twice" by King Tetrus.

to Keep Your Face Covered II.

 Following up on the previous article, here are some additional arguments:

Behind A Mask 

If the legal framework justifies a ban on covering the face on the grounds that the face must be visible or identifiable, it should be able to explain why it permits other material ways of covering or masking the face that can significantly alter its appearance.

Make-up constitutes a material, physical layer applied to the face, including prosthetic makeup. In this sense, it can be considered a form of physically covering or masking the face, even though it does not involve covering it with fabric.

If the purpose of the ban is to preserve a person’s identifiability, physical visibility of the face cannot be confused with the identifiability of the person. A face can be completely uncovered while its appearance can simultaneously be altered through prosthetic and cosmetic means to such an extent that the person is not recognizable to the public.

That in itself, and perhaps even more so when combined with different-colored contact lenses or a wig.

 The second part of the article looks at 

the Dutch model.

The Dutch model directly supports the argument I made in the previous article: if there is genuinely a need to identify a person, it is not necessary for their face to be continuously visible in public. The Dutch government explicitly states that face coverings may be worn on the street and that the police may ask a person to uncover their face if this is necessary for identification.

The following text is taken directly from the website of the Dutch government: (1)

 Partial ban on face-covering clothing

 

 In the Netherlands, people have the right to dress as they wish, regardless of what others think about it. In some locations, it is important for social safety and service provision that people can look at and recognize one another. The government therefore prohibits clothing that completely covers the face in certain locations: on public transport, in education, healthcare, and in government buildings.

Looking at and recognizing one another

In some places, it is necessary for people to look at and communicate with one another. This is important for providing good services. For the safety of visitors, patients, and staff, it is important to be able to recognize who is in the building or on public transport.

Locations where face-covering clothing is prohibited

In everyday language, people also sometimes use the terms burqa ban or niqab ban. The prohibition under the Partial Ban on Face-Covering Clothing Act applies in several places, namely:

educational institutions;

healthcare institutions;

public transport;

government buildings.

This includes, for example, a full-face motorcycle helmet, a balaclava, or a niqab. The ban on face-covering clothing applies to everyone. This includes visitors, employees, teachers, students, and patients.

Face-covering clothing on the street

In other places and on the street, people are still allowed to wear face-covering clothing. The police may ask a person to remove the face covering if this is necessary for identification.

Exceptions to the ban

There are several exceptions to the ban:

People may wear face-covering clothing if it is necessary to protect their bodies. An example is a welder’s safety mask.

The ban does not apply to clients, patients, or their visitors in residential areas of healthcare institutions where people stay for longer periods of time. For example, a senior citizens’ residential complex. The residential area is considered the private domain of clients or patients.

Face-covering clothing is permitted during festive and cultural activities taking place at a location where the ban applies. The clothing must be appropriate according to social norms and is permitted only when the clothing is an inseparable part of the celebration. For example, masks or other face coverings during a Sinterklaas celebration or carnival party at a school. Or a bridal veil during a wedding at the town hall. 

Source: (1) Gedeeltelijk verbod gezichtsbedekkende kleding

 Another point towards female Muslims is that there are probably only about two known cases in Europe in which face covering with burqa was used in connection with an attempted murder or murder. In one case, a woman disguised herself in a burqa so that she would not be recognized, and in the other case, a niqab was used as a disguise during an attempted contract killing. However, it is crucial to point out one thing: in these cases, these were not Muslim women who normally wore a burqa or niqab for religious reasons. Rather, religious clothing was used as a disguise in order to conceal the person’s identity. These cases may therefore show that covering the face can make it more difficult to identify a perpetrator, but they are not in themselves evidence that Muslim women who wear the niqab for religious reasons pose a security risk.

to Keep Your Face Covered

Safety and Privacy and the Rights and Freedoms

 

 I can’t help but find it almost absurdly amusing sometimes when pro-Russian individuals from some government, and others like them, attack Muslims. What is particularly strange is that there are more Muslims living in Russia than in a number of European countries that are themselves the targets of a criticism. And secondly, these critics often reject European values themselves, so, figuratively speaking, they are only making themselves look even more hypocritical.

As for me, I often spend time in Western European communities where people of Muslim background also live. It was also from some of these people that I experienced friendliness and respect — and that was long before I ever wrote these words. Obviously, for reasons that we can all understand. These people, who are part of Western society, have, in my experience, shown greater respect for rights and freedoms than those who themselves attack or question them.

Because of these Western communities, I get the feeling that hatred toward people of different nationalities or background is largely something that takes place especially online or in certain countries, rather than in the reality I know through these Western communities. A truth is also that these communities also include people working in public offices and the police from diverse backgrounds, and in my opinion this also helps determine how well society functions.

To be honest, I don’t like bans on covering the face either. I have several reasons for this, including personal ones. If someone voluntarily decides to cover their face in public, in my opinion they should have the right to do so.

Furthermore, the protection of freedom of religion is itself part of the European and international human-rights framework. Respect for these rights should be universal—by all humans. These thoughts are fundamentally rooted in human rights and freedoms themselves, because I see human rights and freedoms as an essential expression of true human freedom—One person’s freedom ends where another person’s begins.

Just look, for example, at celebrities whom, in the United States for example, sometimes cover their faces in order to preserve their safety and privacy. They have their reasons for doing so — and the right to privacy and safety is one of them, because these possibilities for madness around them… 

For this reason, banning someone from covering their face seems to me, in a certain sense, to restrict their right to privacy or safety. For some people, having their face covered may be a way of preserving at least some degree of privacy in a particular society, or even of maintaining a sense of security. I myself could appreciate having such an option in certain situations or societies. 

In my opinion, the right to see a person’s face should belong only to an authority that is legally empowered to require it. Likewise, a person should not be required to prove their identity to anyone other than the authorities designated to do so. If someone does not need to establish their identity to an authorized authority in a particular situation, I see no reason why they should be forced to show their face. 

And, just to lighten things up a little, I could also mention some of these girls — for example, when they sit down next to you on a train with their faces covered by a mask, even though the pandemic has been over for a long time. 

One might then think that sometimes it really isn’t such a bad thing for people to keep at least a little bit of their identity or security to themselves.

In the end, also during many events is possible to keep your face covered. Not just during a Halloween one. They could just as well ban makeup, because sometimes it also means you’re not seeing a person’s real face. Or they could just ban a hair color, because a hair color change can be the change for an identity itself. 

I also now remember that during the pandemic, I liked wearing face masks. Respirators were more difficult to wear, but I genuinely liked wearing masks. Sometimes people would ask me, including at events where I was on probation, why I was wearing a mask when I wasn’t required by organizers. After the pandemic, I was disappointed that wearing a mask was no longer considered appropriate.

I also admit that even in June 2023, when I was travelling to an event in the Netherlands, I took advantage of the fact that it had only been a short time since the requirement to wear a respirator on public transport in Germany had been lifted, and I wore one during the journey for personal reasons. I like Germany, and it was not meant to be anything personal against Germany, but I wanted to be at least somewhat covered.

A relevant is also Cyprus—a European Union country. If we include the entire island, including Northern Cyprus, Muslims make up approximately a quarter of the population. Although Cyprus ranks lower in some overall safety or peace rankings, this is significantly influenced by the island’s long-standing geopolitical conflict and division. But according to the UN, in 2024 there was approximately one intentional homicide per 100,000 inhabitants in Cyprus, equivalent to 0.001% of the population per year. Latvia, another EU country, has a population of around 1.8 million, with Muslims accounting for approximately 0.06% of the population. Latvia has the highest homicide rate in the EU; according to statistics, it is 4.0 per 100,000 inhabitants.

Public Transport in the Countryside

How Public Transportation Works in Small German Municipalities

 Recently, I also mentioned high-speed trains in Germany, but I have another fact about a frequent public transport services in Germany.

 When people hear the term public transport, most imagine a large city. Buses, trams or the metro, a dense network of stops, and services running at short intervals. In reality, however, a similar principle can also work in a small municipality.

German municipalities are a good example. For instance, a municipality with just under 4,000 inhabitants may have approaching 40 public transport stops connecting different parts of the municipality. There may even be several stops along a single street, located relatively close to one another, making public transport more accessible to people living in many parts of a relative short street. So public transportation therefore does not function merely as a connection between a small municipality and the nearest larger city or another municipality. Individual routes connect different parts of the municipality itself. Public transport routes pass through numerous local districts, allowing them to be connected with one another.

It is not only the number of connections that matters, although services can also be quite frequent. The density of stops and the possibility of using public transport for short journeys within the municipality are equally important. In some small German municipalities, therefore, stops can be found relatively very close to one another. Public transport is thus not merely a means of travelling to another city or municipality, but functions much like urban public transportation. In other words, the routes run between its individual Ortsteile (districts).

Small German municipalities demonstrate that public transport does not have to begin only in cities with tens of thousands, millions of inhabitants. If a network is designed to connect the different parts of a small municipality as well, it can have a similar importance for its residents as urban public transport does in a larger city.

Hot As Hades

 The Ecstasy of these Days 

  In the end of May 2026, I wrote about a my Sunday night silent disco dance in the Zuid Holland, when I danced on bed and listened to the same trance track—Hot As Hades (John O’Callaghan Remix)—for two hours of dancing. 

And as a drink was an ordinary Dutch blackcurrant lemonade—pretty strong taste of this drink from Zeeland.

I also wrote that I sometimes added my own truly trance lyrics instead of the original trance ones in the Hot As Hades (John O’Callaghan Remix)…

One of the truly trance lyrics was actually sad—it was about the end of the summer season and the loss of a summer love. 

I kept parts of that lyric: 

 As she slowly fades now there, 

 she turns. 

 I feel the same. 

 She drugs me in with her eyes. 

 I leave my heart. 

 We come down together. 

 I can take this better. 

 She is my one, only love now. 

 We fall together. 

…

 The summer time comes to an end. 

 Butterflies are ceasing to fly. 

 The dance of Heart in your eyes, 

 is missing to my heart. 

 You’re the Miss heart. 

 Miss heart, 

 Miss heart, 

 Miss heart, 

 Miss heart, 

 …